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THEN AND NOW IN THE 
LAW OF PROPERTY 
John V. Orth† 
OR MANY PEOPLE, the past is merely a cabinet of curiosities 
to be examined in greater or less detail as time allows, be-
fore getting to the serious business of the present. But the 
past has an unsettling way of cropping up in the present, 
even in so practical a field as property law. “Then” may suddenly 
become “now.” 
THEN . . . 
ong ago and far away, in England hundreds of years ago, when a 
landed gentleman died, his widow was provided for by dower, a 
life estate in one-third of all the real property of which her husband 
was seised of an estate of inheritance during coverture1 – in the case 
of a large landowner, a comfortable provision for the rest of her life. 
His eldest son was his sole heir by right of primogeniture,2 keeping 
                                                                                                 
† John Orth is the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of North 
Carolina School of Law. His series of articles, “Reappraisals in the Law of Property,” written 
for the Green Bag is available in book form from Ashgate Publishing (2010). 
1 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *129-30 (“Tenant in 
dower is where the husband of a woman is seised of an estate of inheritance, and 
dies; in this case, the wife shall have the third part of all the lands and tenements 
whereof he was seised during the coverture, to hold to herself for the term of her 
natural life.”) (italics in original). 
2 Limitation of inheritance to the eldest son was actually the product of the interac-
tion of three canons of inheritance described by Blackstone: 
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the family property intact for the next generation. Of course, if his 
family had engaged in the sophisticated estate planning of the day, 
his land was likely entailed, that is, limited to him and the heirs of 
his body, a safeguard to prevent him or any of his descendants from 
losing the entire estate.3 If his younger son had been provided for by 
entering a monastery, the young man was treated as if dead, his as-
sets (if any) administered like those of any other decedent.4 
NOW . . . 
ower survived into modern times – it’s not entirely gone from 
American law even now5 – but in most states it has been re-
placed by the spouse’s elective share, applicable not only to real 
property but also to an increasing array of personal property.6 Re-
                                                                                                 
“I. The first rule is, that inheritances shall lineally descend to the issue of 
the person last actually seized, in infinitum; but shall never lineally as-
cend . . . . 
II. A second general rule or canon is, that the male issue shall be admitted 
before the female . . . . 
III. A third rule, or canon of descent, is this; that where there are two or 
more males in equal degree, the eldest only shall inherit; but the females 
all together.” 
 Id. *208, *212, *214. Although failing male issue, multiple daughters could 
inherit, they took “all together,” as tenants in coparcenary. Id. *187-91. 
3 A tenant in tail could not alienate any interest greater than a life estate. Not only 
did the fee tail protect the estate from spendthrift heirs, but also during the ages 
when the punishment for treason included the forfeiture of estates, it protected 
the families of those on the losing side of civil conflict. See id. *116. The U.S. 
Constitution prohibits forfeiture except for the life of the traitor. U.S. Const. 
Art. III, § 3. 
4 2 Blackstone, Commentaries *132 (Death is “either a civil or a natural death. The 
civil death commences, if any man . . . enters into religion; that is, goes into a 
monastery, and becomes there a monk professed: in which case[] he is absolutely 
dead in law, and his next heir shall have his estate.”). See also id. *121. 
5 “In only four jurisdictions – Arkansas, Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio – does 
dower exist as it was known to the common law.” Jesse Dukeminier et al., Wills, 
Trusts, and Estates 476 n. 1 (8th ed. 2009). 
6 See, e.g., Uniform Probate Code § 2-202 et seq. (1990, as amended 2008). 
Neither dower nor the elective share is known in community property states, 
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cently, dower has made an unlikely reappearance. In 2004, Con-
gress passed the American Indian Probate Reform Act,7 the latest 
effort to remedy the problem caused by forcing Native Americans to 
accept the European settlers’ system of property law. Over the cen-
tury since the passage of the Dawes Act in 1887,8 Indian allotments 
splintered into uneconomic fragments, divided equally among the 
heirs at each generation.9 Under the new law, Indian trust land may 
be devised only to other Native Americans or to the tribe.10 In case 
of intestacy, the decedent’s spouse is guaranteed one-third of the 
trust personalty and a life estate in all the lands owned by the dece-
dent11 – in other words, dower enlarged and made gender-neutral, 
to suit modern sensibilities. 
New-fangled dower is not restricted to descendants of the first 
peoples. The Qualified Terminal Interest Property trust, familiarly 
known to estate lawyers as the QTIP trust, is a product of tax reform 
in 1982. So long as the donor spouse creates a trust giving the surviv-
ing spouse support for life (a “terminal interest”), the property quali-
fies for favorable tax treatment. While not restricted by gender, it is 
commonly used to provide for widows.12 As one scholar has recog-
nized, “with QTIP, the new federal law of dower was born.”13 
Primogeniture faded early in Britain’s American colonies. By the 
                                                                                                 
where acquisitions during marriage are presumed to be owned equally by both 
spouses. 
7 25 U.S.C. § 2206. 
8 General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (named for Sen. H.L. 
Dawes (R.-Mass.)) (making allotments inheritable, but not alienable or devisable). 
9 For the extreme fractionation of Native American allotments, see Hodel v. Irving, 
481 U.S. 704 (1987) (“The average tract has 196 owners and the average owner 
undivided interests in 14 tracts.”). See also Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anti-
commons, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998). 
10 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (a)(1). 
11 Id. (a)(2)(A)(i) (if decedent is survived by one or more eligible heirs, the surviv-
ing spouse receives one-third of the trust personalty and a life estate in the realty). 
12 See Dukeminier, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 480 (note on the “estate tax marital 
deduction and the dependency of women”). 
13 Mary M. Wenig, Taxing Marriage, 6 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 561 (1997). 
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end of the seventeenth century, it had disappeared from every colo-
ny in New England.14 The more tradition-bound Southern states 
moved to end the practice only after the Revolution.15 But the 
American Indian Probate Reform Act also resuscitates primogeni-
ture, and for the same reason that it arose in medieval England – to 
prevent the fracturing of estates. If the intestate decedent owned 
less than a 5% interest in a parcel, the interest is not divided fur-
ther, but passes to the oldest child or grandchild – in other words, 
primogeniture without the preference for males.16 
England had managed through an elaborate array of legal fictions 
in the fifteenth century to eliminate the fee tail as an effective de-
vice,17 but the entailed estate enjoyed an incongruous revival in the 
colonial South, until it was swept away by the egalitarian impulse 
stimulated by the American Revolution.18 Although primogeniture 
and entail are no longer in the legal toolbox, the purposes they 
served – keeping family estates intact and sheltered from spendthrift 
heirs – remain attractive. To serve their wealthy clients, lawyers 
turned to trusts, the modern descendants of medieval “uses.” Long 
constrained by the abstruse Rule Against Perpetuities,19 which lim-
ited the reach of the dead hand to no more than the next two or 
three generations, modern dynasts and their bankers and lawyers 
achieved a breakthrough in the last quarter century.20 The repeal of 
                                                                                                 
14 Carol Shammas et al., Inheritance in America: From Colonial Times to the Present 32-33 
(1987). 
15 John V. Orth, After the Revolution: “Reform” of the Law of Inheritance, 10 Law & Hist. 
Rev. 33-44 (1992). 
16 25 U.S.C. § 2206(a)(2)(D). 
17 See 2 Blackstone, Commentaries *116. 
18 See, e.g., John V. Orth, Does the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina?, 23 Wake Forest 
L. Rev. 767-95 (1988). 
19 As formulated by John Chipman Gray in his classic treatise, the Rule Against 
Perpetuities provides that “no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not 
later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.” John 
Chipman Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 201, p. 191 (4th ed. 1942). 
20 The movement to repeal the Rule Against Perpetuities was in response to the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1431(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 2601), 
which created the generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax. For a list of states that 
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the Rule in more and more states, coupled with the now universal 
acceptance of spendthrift clauses,21 has made possible the modern 
dynasty trust, “a sort of throwback to entail.”22 
Civil death passed out of English law with the dissolution of the 
monasteries in the 1530s, although its ghost lingers to the present 
day in the language of conveyancing: “to A for and during the term 
of his natural life.”23 But the legal fiction of treating a living person as 
if dead has proved useful in solving new problems. As the traditional 
law of intestate succession interacted with modern estate and inher-
itance taxation, heirs demanded to be allowed to disclaim their in-
heritance,24 thereby avoiding the tax consequences of automatic suc-
cession while letting the property pass to the next in line. The solu-
tion was to treat disclaimants as having died “immediately before the 
time of distribution.”25 The same device proved useful in case a 
murderer would succeed to the property of the victim. At one time, 
when capital punishment was more prevalent, the problem caused 
by the operation of the ordinary rules of succession was quickly 
solved by the execution of the criminal. But as capital punishment 
                                                                                                 
had repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities as of the date of publication, see John 
V. Orth, Allowing Perpetuities in North Carolina, 31 Campbell L. Rev. 399 (2009). 
For an analysis of the role played by competition among the states to secure trust 
business, see Robert H. Sitkoff and Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competi-
tion for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 Yale L.J. 356 
(2005). For a brief review of other instances in which jurisdictional competition 
was a source of change in property law, see John V. Orth, “The Race to the Bottom”: 
Competition in the Law of Property, 9 Green Bag 2d 46 (2005). 
21 See, e.g., Uniform Trust Code § 502 (2000, as amended 2005) (defining a spend-
thrift provision as one that “restrains both voluntary and involuntary transfer of a 
beneficiary’s interest”). 
22 Adam Hirsch, Inheritance: United States Law, in 3 Oxford International Encyclopedia of 
Legal History 235, 239 (2009). 
23 The qualifier “natural” was needed only when civil death was possible (for abjur-
ing the realm, entering a monastery, or attaint for treason or felony); it is now 
obsolete. Oxford Companion to Law 222. 
24 A similar problem did not arise with testate succession since a devisee like any 
other donee was always free to refuse to accept the gift. 
25 See, e.g., Uniform Probate Code § 2-1106. 
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waned and more diverse means of profiting from the death of the 
victim developed, increasingly sophisticated slayer statutes were 
adopted. Again, the solution was to treat the slayer as having dis-
claimed the property.26 
Why this persistence of the past? Why does it never really die? 
The answer, of course, is that many of the problems of succession 
on death are perennial and the contraptions in the old cabinet can 




                                                                                                 
26 See, e.g., id. § 2-803. 
